Frequentist Priors by Hwang, Jiunn T. et al.
BU-924-M 
FREQUENTIST PRIORS 
By Jiunn T. Hwang1 and George Casella2 
CorneLl Un.ivers.it:y 
~S 1980 subject classif.ications. 62F99, 62F25 
Key words and phrases. Conditional inference, Bayes. 
May, 1987 
1 Research supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. DMS8506847. 
2 Research supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. DMS8501973. 
\ 
SUMMARY 
One way of attaining coherent post-data probability statements is 
through the use of posterior probabilities based on proper prior distri-
butions. Classical frequency theory does not recognize the use of priors 
and, in some cases, coherent post-data inference cannot be made. Bayesian 
theory, however, does depend on the use of priors, and if one is to 
reconcile these two points of view in the set estimation problem, one needs 
a prior that is acceptable to a frequentist. Such a prior, which can lead 
to reconciliation, is called a frequentist prior, and can be used as a 
basis for coherent post-data inference. Existence and other properties of 
these priors are investigated. 
-1-
1. Introduction. In the frequency theory of statistics, all proba-
bility statements are based on a repeated sampling framework. These 
probabilities are pre-data probabilities; in particular, confidence 
statements can be asserted before the data are seen. Furthermore, once the 
data have been seen the frequentist is left with nothing. In the words of 
LeCam (1984), frequency theory"··· does not have any probabilities to play 
with once the dice have been cast." 
Once the dice have been cast, or once the data have been collected, 
the frequentist has nothing random left to base probability statements on. 
This is a shortcoming of frequency theory for at least two reasons. One, 
the more practical, is that users want to make post-data probability 
statements, and will do so even without a legitimate probability structure. 
Two, the more philosophical reason, is that frequentist probability 
assertions ignore the observed data, and surely one should be able to 
produce better inferences by not ignoring this information. 
The problem lies not in the necessity of post-data inference: we 
believe that most statisticians would agree that post-data inference is a 
desirable thing. The problem lies in the mechanism available for frequen-
tist post-data probability. As LeCam states, there is none. 
Theories of conditional inference, which can provide a type of 
post-data assessment, have been around for a long time (Fisher, 1956; 
Buehler, 1959; Kiefer, 1977; Robinson, 1979). Most recently, Casella 
(1985,1986) has attempted to interpret the pre-data frequentist confidence 
in a post-data setting, using the theory of relevant betting procedures. 
These conditional theories attempt to give an objective post-data assess-
ment, but there is an underlying connection in this work: coherent 
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post-data assessments come from Bayes or limits of Bayes procedures, with 
the strongest conditional properties belonging to procedures based on 
proper priors (Robinson, 1979; Pierce, 1973). 
Why is coherent post-data inference so intertwined with Bayes proce-
dures? The mathematics is inarguable, but the intuition is even more 
illuminating: the only probability available post-data is subjective 
probability, so post-data inferences must necessarily be subjective. The 
frequentist is backed into a Bayesian corner: he must formulate a subjec-
tive opinion on which to base post-data statements. 
The frequentist is, therefore, in the (somewhat uncomfortable) 
position of having to formulate a prior if he wants to make coherent 
post-data statements. Of course, noninformative or other improper priors 
can be used, but this tactic really avoids the primary issue. If one is 
forced to use subjective information, why not do the best possible job? 
In this paper we investigate the types of proper priors that might be 
acceptable to a frequentist. We make some broad assumptions on the prior, 
and assume that a prior median can be specified. Other than that, the form 
of the prior is left unspecified. We also confine ourselves, for the most 
part, to the one parameter location case, although extensions to a case 
with nuisance parameters, or to higher dimensions, are possible. 
Given that an experimenter observes X according to f(x-e), and has a 
prior 'IT( e) with median Jl, we can loosely define three possible cases: 
I. The data and the prior agree. 
II. The data and the prior disagree moderately. 
III. The data and the prior disagree greatly. 
In Case I there is no problem: the sample density and the prior are 
quite close, and the subjective post-data assessment will agree with a 
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pre-data assessment. In fact, the post-data confidence level will be 
greater than the pre-data one. Case II poses many problems, most of which 
will not be answered here. Pre-data and post-data confidence levels will 
be discrepant, and belief in the post-data probability necessitates belief 
in the form of the prior, a step the frequentist may not want to take. 
Case III can be resolved, however, and its resolution provides us with 
a class of priors that may be acceptable to the frequentist. If the data 
and the prior disagree greatly, the frequentist has only one choice: 
believe the data. More precisely, if C = {8: 18-XI ~c} is a 1-a frequen-
tist confidence set, then the posterior probability of C must satisfy 
( 1.1) ~im P(e £ CIX) = 1-a 
IX-111~ 
where 11 is the prior median. Note that condition (1.1) is different from a 
standard Bayesian asymptotic result: If X is the mean of a sample of size 
n 
n, then 
(1. 2) ~im P(e £ c IX ) = 1-a 
n~ n n 
where C = {8:18-X I ~ c/J~}. Condition (1.2) is essentially a variance 
n n 
condition: as the sampling variance ~ 0 the prior washes out. Condition 
(1.1) compares two proper densities with finite variances (in most cases), 
and need not hold even if (1.2) does. If f(x-8) is n(8,1) and ~(e) is 
n(0,1), then (1.2) but not (1.1) holds. 
A problem similar to the one described here has previously been 
addressed by Dawid (1973), and later by Meeden and Isaacson (1977). 
Generalizing Dawid's work, Meeden and Isaacson are concerned with the 
"large X" behavior of a posterior distribution, and find conditions under 
which these "large X" posteriors are normal. They also study the behavior 
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of the Bayes point estimate. In the present work our concern is with 
"large X" behavior of confidence intervals, not point estimates. 
We consider a prior to be minimally acceptable to a frequentist if 
(1.1) holds, and thus it can be used as a basis for coherent post-data 
inference. This inference, used in conjunction with a pre-data confidence 
level, can provide a total inference for a frequentist, one that uses both 
the repeated sampling framework (pre-data) and a subjective framework 
(post-data). 
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2. Preli•inaries. For the most part we will be concerned with the 
location parameter problem with the following assumptions: 
(2.1) 
a) Xl9 ~ f(x-9), where 9 is the median of X, 
f(·) is a proper density with unbounded support, 
and has tails that are decreasing outside of a 
compact set, 
b) 9 ~ w(9), where the median of 9, ~' is taken to 
be zero without loss of generality. w(·) is a 
bounded density that gives positive mass to all 
points in its support. 
Some of the following theorems will need additional assumptions on either f 
or w. These will be stated where needed. 
We assume that f(·) has unbounded support mainly for convenience. Some 
of the theorems contained here can be made to apply to the bounded support 
case, but the type of reconciliation that we are looking for, as stated in 
(1.1), will not generally obtain. 
Given the sampling density f(x-9), the frequentist constructs a 1-a 
confidence set C(X) = {9: 19-XI ~ c}, where cis chosen to satisfy the 
frequentist probability constraint: 
(2.2) 1-a = P(9 e C(X) 19) = J f(x-e)dx 
{x:9eC(x)} 
Note that although we are taking C to be a symmetric set here, there is no 
loss in generality: any bounded set would serve as well. Using the prior 
w(9), the Bayesian can make a post-data probability assessment of the 
confidence set C, its posterior credible probability, given by 
J f(x-9)~(9)d9 
( 2. 3) P(9 e C(x) lx) = ..._{e.;..;:;,..;:;9"""'e.;;;..C(...,x=)..._} ___ _ g, 
J f(x-9)~(9)de 
-<0 
Our concept of frequentist priors requires agreement between (2.2) and the 
limit of (2.3): 
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DEFINITION 2.1. For X and 9 as in (2.1) and C(X) as in (2.2), we say 
that n(9) is a frequentist prior with respect to C(X) if 
~im P(9 e C(X)IX=x) = P(9 e C(X)j9) = 1-a 
lxl-n> 
Informally speaking, the prior must wash out as the data and the prior 
information become more discrepant. Thus, the specification of a frequen-
tist prior is really only a specification of tail behavior of~(·) relative 
to f(·). We first can get some rather simple characterizations of 
frequentist priors. 
THEOREM 2.1. Let X and e be as in (2.1), and suppose that there 
exists a function g(X) such that 
(2.4) ~im ~(x-y) = 1 V y 
lxl-+cn g(x) and 
Then 1r is a frequentist prior for C = {e: 
m 
( 2. 5) ~im J f(y)~(x-y)dy = 1 = 
lxl-n> g(x) 
-m 
c f ~(x-y) dy < m • sup g(x) 
X 
-c 
1e-x1 s c} if and only if 
(I) 
f '-im f~y~~~x-y}d lxl-n> g(x) y 
-m 
PROOF. The posterior probability of C can be written as 
P( e e: C(X) IX=x) 
c f f( y) 1r(x-y) d g(x) y 
= _-.;;;.c _____ _ 
f f(y) 1T(x-y)d g(x) y 
c 
As lxl ~ m, the numerator clearly goes to j f(y)dy = 1-a by (2.4) and 
-c 
the Dominated Convergence Theorem. Therefore, the posterior coverage 
probability approaches one if and only if the denominator converges to one. H 
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Note that, in fact, 1-a is an upper bound on the limiting posterior 
probability under the conditions of Theorem 2.1. This follows from Fatou's 
Lemma: 
(X) (X) 
1-im inf 
lxl~ 
J f(y) ~(x-y) dy ~ g(x) J 1-im inf f(y) ~(x-y) dy = 1 lxl~ g(x) 
-<XI -<XI 
The existence of a function g(·) to satisfy conditions (2.4) appears 
to be a necessary condition for~(·) to be a frequentist prior, although 
the limit condition is minor, and is usually satisfied since c is finite. 
These conditions, however, are certainly not sufficient as the next theorem 
shows: 
THEOREM 2.2. Let X and 9 be as in (2.1). Let g(·) be any function 
satisfying (2.4). Suppose there exists a positive constant k such that 
(2.6) 1-im f(x+k) > 0 x~ g(x) 
then ~ is not a frequentist prior for f. 
PROOF. From Theorem 2.1, if~ is a frequentist prior then (2.5) must 
be satisfied. This, in particular, implies that 
x+k 
( 2. 7) 1-im I 
X~ 
X 
f(y) w(x-y) dy = 0 
g(x) 
However, for sufficiently large x, 
x+k 
(2.8) I f(y) ~(x-y) dy ~ ~*k f(x+k) g(x) g(x) 
X 
where w* = inf{w(u): -k ~ u ~ 0} > 0 by (2.lb), and we have used the fact 
that f has decreasing tails outside a compact set. Using (2.8), the limit 
of the LHS of (2.7) is positive, contradicting (2.6) and proving the 
theorem. II 
-8-
We can similarly prove an analog to Theorem 2.2, that refers to the 
lefthand tail off(·). In particular, if x ~ -m and there exists a k < 0 
satisfying (2.6), then 1r(9) will not be a frequentist prior. (A similar 
comment applies to Theorem 2.3, below.) 
We, therefore, see that the existence of a function g(·) satisfying 
(2.4) cannot be a sufficient condition for 1r(·) to be a frequentist prior. 
This was expected, however, since we would believe that a sufficient 
condition must somehow involve the sampling density f(·). Although we 
haven't tried to investigate all the possible limits of 1r(x-y)/g(x), we 
have investigated one alternative to condition (2.4), and that alternative 
is given in the following theorem. Note that additional assumptions on 
both the prior and sampling density are required. 
THEOREM 2 • 3. Let X and 9 be as in (2.1), and, in addition, assume 
that f is symmetric and 1r is unimodal and differentiable. If there exists 
a function g(x) satisfying (2.4) and 
a. 
b. 
,tim ..1. ?r(x-y) 
x~ Cly g(x) converges uniformly for y in an 
open interval containing [-c,c] 
.tim 1r(x-y) = h(y), where h(y) + h(-y) is nonconstant, x~ g(x) 0 < y < c , 
then 1r is not a frequentist prior with respect to {9:19-XI ~ c}. 
The proof of Theorem 2.3 will rely on the following well-known lemma: 
LEMMA 2 .1. Let f 1(y) and f 2(y) be positive functions, and let 
f 1(y)/f2(y) be increasing and nonconstant for 0 < y < x. Then 
f fl(y)dy 
0 
provided the integrals are finite. 
< 
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PROOF of Theorem 2.3. As before, we can write the limiting posterior 
probability as 
( 2. 9) 
~im P(e e C(X)IX=x) 
x-+c» 
c l f(y) 1J(x-y)d g(x) Y 
= ~im --~c ____ _ 
x-+c»<XI I f(y) 
-<XI 
c 
1J(x-y)d 
g(x) y 
1 f(y)h(y)dy 
~ -c 
1 f(y)h(y)dy 
-<XI 
where we have used Dominated Convergence and (2.4) in the numerator and 
Fatou's Lemma in the denominator. By the symmetry off, expression (2.9) 
is equal to 
(2.10) 
c f f(y)[h(y)+h(-y)]dy 
0 
f f(y)[h(y)+h(-y)]dy 
0 
If the function h(y) + h(-y) were increasing, we could apply Lemma 2.1 with 
f 1(y) = f(y)[h(y) + h(-y)] and f 2(y) = f(y) to deduce that (2.10) is less 
than 1-a, and hence 1J(9) is not a frequentist prior. 
Thus, to complete the proof we need to show that h(y) + h(-y) is 
increasing, or equivalently, 
(2.11) d dy [h(y) + h(-y)] < 0, for I y I < c • 
By the unimodality of 1r, h(·) is increasing and hence h'(·) > 0. There-
fore, (2.11) is automatically satisfied if :y h(-y) = 0. We now consider 
d the case dy h(-y) ¢ 0. Expression (2.11) is equivalent to 
(2.12) 
From the definition of 
( 2 .13) hI (y) ... 
hi (y) 
hI ( -y) 
h(.) ' 
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> 1 v y, 
a 
-.Um [7r(x-y)/g(x)] 
ay x-n> 
for I y I < c • 
a 
- ~im [ay ~(x-y)/g(x)] 
x-n> 
= h' ( -y) a ,_. ;!: [:y ~(x+y)/g(x)] -- 1m [7r(x+y)g(x)] 
ay x-n> 
where this last interchange of limit and derivative follows from condition 
a (see, e.g., Theorem 13-13, Apostol, 1957, pg. 402). Since the last limit 
in (2.13) is equal to the limit of the ratio, we have 
(2.14) 
h' (y) 
hI ( -y) = -
= 
= 
L w(x-y) 
1-im -=-:y..__ _ _ 
x-n> ay w(x+y) 
.L w(x-y) 
o· .... a .... x __ _ 
,.,1m a 
x-n> ax 'lf(x+y) 
U 'lf(x-y) ~ 'lf(x+y) 
where the last equality follows from L1 Hospital 1 s rule. The unimodality of 
'If implies that 'lf(x-y) > w(x+y) for x > y, showing that the last limit in 
(2.14) is at least 1. Hence, (2.12) is established and the theorem is 
proved. II 
An application of Theorem 2.3 shows that the double exponential 
distribution can never be a frequentist prior. Indeed, if XIS N n(S,l) 
and '11'(9) = e-IGI/B/(2B), then the limiting posterior probability of the set 
C = {9: 19-XI < c} is 
!!: P(9 E Clx) = ~-c - t < Z < c + t) < 1-a 
where Z is a standard normal random variable. 
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Notice that condition (2.9) can be interpreted as saying that, for 
large x, we have 
(2.15) ~(x-y) ~ g(x)h(y) 
for some functions g and h. This is true for the double exponential prior, 
and no doubt is true for other priors as well. The important idea here is 
that if the prior "asymptotically factors" as in (2.15), it cannot be a 
frequentist prior. 
With the possible exception of Theorem 2.3, the results in this 
section are quite broad. Specific cases tend to be somewhat more inform-
ative and have greater practical import. We look at some special cases in 
the next section. 
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3. The normal and t-distributions. In location parameter problems 
the most often assumed density (in classical statistics) is the normal 
density. Moreover, standard Bayesian textbook examples are often based on 
a normal-normal setup. Since the normal distribution has the sharpest 
tails among common (unbounded) densities, the fact that it fails as a 
frequentist prior should come as no surprise. This detail is taken care of 
in the following theorem. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let X N f(X-e) satisfy condition (2.1), and let ~(e) • 
n(O,l). The normal prior is not a frequentist prior for any C = 
{9: 19-XI S c} with positive confidence coefficient. In fact, P(9 £ C!x) ~ 0 
as lxl ~ <n. 
PROOF. An upper bound on P(e £ Clx) can be obtained by 
c 
I f(y)~(x-y)dy 
P(a £ Clx) = -c (I) 
f f( y )~( x-y )dy 
-(I) 
Q) 
( 3.1) = (1-a) I j f ( y) 
-Q) 
c 
I f( ) [ max ~(x-t)] d y ltl<c y 
s -c Q) 
f f(y )~( x-y )dy 
-Q) 
~(x-y) dy 
max ~(x-t) 
ltl~c 
As lxl ~ <n, if the limit of the denominator in (3.1) is greater than 1, 
then ~ cannot be a frequentist prior. It suffices to consider only x > 0. 
From Fatou's Lemma, ~im P(a £ C!x) is bounded above by (3.1). However, 
X~ 
for the normal case 
Urn ~(x-y) 
x~ max ~(x-t) 
ltl~c 
establishing the theorem. II 
= CX)' for y > c , 
-13-
A much more interesting special case is that of a t sampling density 
vs. a t prior density. Lett(·) denote the density of Student's t with v 
v 
degrees of freedom, and consider the sample density to be f(x-9) = t (x-9) p 
and the prior density to be ~(9) = t (9). Since the degrees of freedom q 
controls the tail of the distribution (along with existence of moments), 
the relationship of the sample to prior degrees of freedom should determine 
when a particular prior is a frequentist prior. The following theorem 
completely specifies the situation. 
THEOREM 3 • 2 • Let X-9 - t (x-9) and 9 - ~(9) = t (9). p q 
frequentist prior if and only if p > q. 
PROOF. For the function g(x) = t (x) we have q 
,tim 
lxl~ 
t (x-t) ~(x-t) = ,tim -9~~- = 1 
g(x) lxl~ tq(x) 
Then t is a q 
so, by Theorem 2.1, it is sufficient to examine the behavior of 
(3. 3) t (y) p 
First consider p ~ q. It is easy to check that for any positive constant k 
( 3. 4) 
t (x+k) 
,tim i (x) > 0 
X~ q 
if p ~ q 
so an application of Theorem 2.2 will show that t cannot be a frequentist q 
prior if p ~ q. (In fact, if p < q then the limit in ( 3. 4) is infinite, 
showing that P(9 € Clx) ~ 0 as x ~ m. For p > q, we need to show that the 
limit in (3.3) is equal to 1. Fix €, 0 < € < 1, and divide the region of 
integration into two parts: {y: IYI < Elxl} and {y: IYI > Elxl}. We now 
establish that, if p > q, then 
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tim J t (x-y) ( 3. 5) t (y) g 0 t (x) dy = 
lxl~{y:lyl>elxl} p q 
and 
t (x-y) 
tim J (3. 6) t (y) g dy = 1 p t (x) lxl~{y:lyl<elxl} q 
Combining (3.5) and (3.6) will show that (3.3) is equal to 1, establishing 
that tq is a frequentist prior. 
To establish (3.5), note that the integral is trivially bounded by 
which goes to zero as lxl ~ oo, 
t (elxl) 
tq(x-y)dy = ~ (x) 
q 
To establish (3.6), first note that for 
IYI < elxl, t (x-y) < t [(1-e)lxl] and also q q 
!00 t [ (1-e) I xI ] tim t (y) 9 t (x) X~ p q 
-oo 
00 
= f ,tim 
X~ 
-oo 
t (y) p 
t [(1-e)lxl] 
9 
t (x) q 
by directly calculating both sides. This allows us to apply a generalized 
Dominated Convergence Theorem (Billingsley, 1986, Exercise 16.6) to pull 
the limit inside the integral in (3.6) and establish the equality. H 
The results of Theorem 3.2 have implications in case of estimating 
the mean of a normal distribution with unknown variance. In particular, if 
X ··• X are iid n(9,cr 2 ), consider a prior distribution 1' ' n 
~(e,cr2) = t (9) 1 d9dcr q rJ 
where we take a noninformative prior on a. Since a is really a nuisance 
parameter here, a noninformative prior seems justified. A standard 
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calculation will show that the distribution of (X,S2 ) given 9 (uncondition-
al on o), is proportional to 
( + n(x-9)2)-n/2 1 (n-1)s 2 
which behaves like a t with n-1 degrees of freedom. If we now consider s 2 
fixed, then we are in the case of Theorem 3.2, and any prior on 9 that is 
flatter than a t 2 will be a frequentist prior. (Note that this is not n-
the standard frequentist inference, which would be unconditional on X and 
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4. Comments and Generalizations. The idea of a frequentist prior is 
not just an oxymoron, but rather a legitimate means for a frequentist to 
make post-data probability statements while retaining a frequency flavor in 
the analysis. Use of a frequentist prior necessitates subjective input, 
but requires that the subjective input never be weighted more than the 
data. Furthermore, use of the frequentist prior is more satisfying than 
the use of a noninformative prior. With the latter type of prior, post-
data probability statements are made with respect to an arbitrary distri-
bution, one which may have no meaning whatsoever in the context of a given 
problem. 
If one starts with a 1-a confidence set C(X), then the post-data 
probability, with respect to a frequentist prior, may be greater than 1-a 
for some data values, but is necessarily less than 1-u for some data values 
(since the priors are proper). This fluctuation is illustrated in Figure 
1, which shows post-data probabilities for at-sampling density using 
different t priors. Control of the amount of variation from the nominal 
1-a has not been addressed here: this is a "second-order" phenomenon and 
will be the basis for future work. 
There are other questions which can be raised, and we will only 
comment on two of them. One is a question of unimodality of the posterior, 
and how it relates to the flatness of the prior. In general, we feel that 
experimenters are most comfortable with unimodal posterior densities, or 
densities that are essentially unimodal. Such posteriors seem to occur 
when the tails of the sample density and prior are different. We have no 
theorems concerning unimodality, but offer Figure 2, which shows the 
situation for two configurations of t densities. In the two cases shown, 
the posterior distributions are not unimodal, showing that whether or not 
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the tails of the sample and prior distributions match, the posterior need 
not be unimodal. In contrast, Figure 3 shows unimodal posteriors arising 
from a normal sample and double exponential prior distributions with very 
different tails. 
A second, more practical question, has to do with multiple observa-
tions. For the most part we have dealt with one observation from a 
location density. If more than one observation is collected, the distri-
bution of the sufficient statistic may not be expressible as a location 
distribution. (If the observations come from a location family that admits 
a unique maximum likelihood estimator, this estimator has a location 
distribution and our results apply to confidence sets centered around it.) 
In general, however, the question of existence of frequentist priors for 
distributions other than those in the location family must be explored. 
As was noted in the text, the results presented here cover sampling 
from a normal distribution, so the multiple observation case is taken care 
of in this situation. In fact, if one considers sampling from a multi-
variate normal density, the results on frequentist priors carry over to 
this case also, if we interpret IX-91 as a multi-dimensional Euclidean 
norm. 
Another simple generalization is to confidence sets of forms other 
than {9: IX-91 ~ c}. Our results hold for any confidence set that col-
lapses to this one as IX-91 ~ ~. In particular, the Stein-type confidence 
sets considered by Casella and Hwang (1987) have the same frequentist 
priors as the usual confidence set. 
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FIG. l. Posterior probabilities for t 10 sampling density 
and five different t prior densities. 
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FIG. 2a. Posterior densities from t 4 sampling density 
and t 3 (mean zero) prior density. 
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FIG. 2b. Posterior densities from t 4 sampling density 
and t 4 (mean zero) prior density. 
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FIG. 3. Posterior densities from normal sample 
density and double exponential (mean 
zero) prior density. 
